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Transparency is one of the biggest innovations in central bank policy of the past quarter century. Modern
central bankers believe that they should be as clear about their objectives and actions as possible. However,
is greater transparency always beneficial?   Recent work suggests that when private agents have diverse
sources of information, public information can cause them to overreact to the signals from the central
bank, leading the economy to be too sensitive to common forecast errors. Greater transparency could
be destabilizing. While this theoretical result has clear intuitive appeal, it turns on a combination of
assumptions and conditions, so it remains to be established that it is of empirical relevance.  
In this paper we study the degree to which increased information about monetary policy might lead
to individuals coordinating their forecasts. Specifically, we estimate a series of simple models to measure
the impact of inflation targeting on the dispersion of private sector forecasts of inflation. Using a panel
data set that includes 15 countries over 20 years we find no convincing evidence that adopting an inflation
targeting regime leads to a reduction in the dispersion of private sector forecasts of inflation. While
for some specifications adoption of inflation target does seem to reduce the standard deviation of inflation
forecasts, the impact is rarely precise and always small.
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1 Introduction 
Transparency is one of the biggest innovations in central bank policy of the past quarter 
century. Modern central bankers believe that they should be as clear about their objectives 
and actions as possible. This notion arises from the view that policymakers should be a 
source of stability, not a source of noise; with the economy and markets responding to data, 
not to the policymakers themselves. 
Inflation targeting is one of the first and most comprehensive implementations derived from 
this view. As a framework for monetary policy, inflation targeting involves ‘the public 
announcement of medium-term numerical targets for inflation [and] increased transparency 
of the monetary policy strategy through communication with the public and the markets about 
plans, objectives, and decisions of the monetary authority’ (Mishkin 2002, pg. 361). The 
result is not only clearly understood and published numerical targets, but also inflation 
reports that explain past and likely future actions. Most economists believe that greater 
transparency is beneficial. See, for example, the survey papers by Walsh (2007), Carpenter 
(2004), Dincer and Eichengreen (2002), and Geraats (2002). However, transparency is not 
nudity. Understanding policymakers' contingency plans does not mean laying the 
policymaking process bare for all to see. Monetary policymakers should not put cameras in 
the meeting room. There are clear limits. What are they? 
Recent theoretical work has put this question into a new perspective. In their pioneering 
work, Morris and Shin (2002 and 2005) show that when private agents have diverse sources 
of information, public information can cause them to overreact to the signals from the central 
bank, which makes the economy too sensitive to common forecast errors. The reason for this 
is that individuals care not only about accurately estimating the state of the economy, but 
also about having an estimate that is not too different from that of others. The implication is 
that more transparency may in fact be destabilising, so policymakers should think long and 
hard before changing their disclosure policies in ways that publicise more information. 
Svensson (2006) and Woodford (2005) both suggest that the Morris and Shin result is likely 
to be a theoretical curiosum rather than anything policymakers should worry about. That is, 
the circumstance under which additional information is welfare reducing is extremely unlikely 
to occur in the real world. As Svensson shows, Morris and Shin's own conclusion only holds 
when the noise in policymakers’ publicly announced information is at least eight times that of 
the private information agents have obtained on their own. That is, public officials must be far 
worse in their evaluations of the economic environment than private agents. Evidence, such 
as that in Romer and Romer (2000), suggests that central bank staff forecasts are at least as 
good, if not better than, those of market economists. Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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Woodford's critique is based on the Morris and Shin choice of how to aggregate the quadratic 
loss functions of the individual agents. In their original paper, Morris and Shin assume that 
policymakers seek to minimise a social loss function that is based on the average squared 
error of individual estimates of the state of the economy. By contrast, if the social welfare 
function includes losses associated with the dispersion of agents’ estimates of the state – 
something Morris and Shin assume the agents themselves care about – then more 
information is unambiguously a good thing. 
Regardless of these two coherent and largely convincing criticisms, the Morris and Shin 
argument retains intuitive appeal. In particular, policymakers worry that releasing more 
information might cause private agents to coordinate expectations, leaving the economy 
more exposed to common shocks. In the end, however, we are left with an empirical 
question: does increased transparency lead to lower dispersion in private forecasts? If the 
answer is no, then there is little to worry about. However, if the answer is yes, we cannot 
necessarily conclude that greater transparency—in the form of adopting an inflation target—
is harmful. The reason is that greater transparency about the fundamentals and long-run 
inflation objective should also lead to a smaller dispersion of inflation forecasts which is 
beneficial. So, a smaller dispersion of private forecasts could reflect the beneficial effects of 
greater transparency and not the harmful effects described by Morris and Shin. 
In this paper we study the degree to which increased information about monetary policy 
might lead to a reduction in the dispersion of inflation forecasts. By combining information 
about whether a country targets inflation with the dispersion of private sector forecasts of 
inflation, we seek to understand how inflation targeting affects private sector behaviour. In 
particular, does inflation targeting lead to a smaller or possibly larger dispersion of private 
sector inflation forecasts? If it leads to a larger dispersion, then there is no need to worry 
about the harmful effects of greater transparency discussed by Morris and Shin. However, if 
inflation targeting leads to a smaller dispersion, then there is at least some evidence that 
increased information could be harmful because it leads individuals to coordinate their 
forecasts à la Morris and Shin or could be beneficial because of additional information about 
central bank objectives and fundamentals. 
In order to examine this, we estimate a series of simple models designed to measure the 
impact of inflation targeting on the dispersion of private sector forecasts of inflation. Using a 
panel data set that includes 15 countries over 20 years we find no convincing evidence that 
adopting an inflation targeting regime leads to a reduction in the dispersion of private sector 
forecasts of inflation. While for some specifications adoption of an inflation target does seem 
to reduce the standard deviation of inflation forecasts, in others it does not. And the precision 
of the estimates is rarely very high. The bulk of our evidence does not support the view that a Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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shift to inflation targeting has resulted in a significant decline in the cross-sectional standard 
deviation of inflation forecasts across survey respondents. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to note that our work is distinct from, but related to, two earlier 
papers. First, Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2004) examine the dispersion of inflation 
expectations in survey data and find that inflation expectations have become more 
concentrated around the mean as the level of inflation has fallen. At first glance this may 
seem as if it is a result that is more positive than ours. But, given that Mankiw, Reis and 
Wolfers only study US data, it is not possible to disentangle the impact of disinflation from 
increased Federal Reserve transparency. 
Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004) investigate how well the mean of inflation expectations has 
been anchored, also from survey data. They provide evidence on how inflation targeting has 
changed the dynamics of inflation. Their results suggest that the adoption of an explicit 
inflation target reduces the correlation of long-run inflation expectations with short-run 
movements in inflation, largely eliminating the link between expectations and realised 
inflation. Furthermore, Levin, Natalucci and Piger find that the adoption of an inflation 
targeting framework lowers the persistence of inflation, so that inflation behaves more like a 
random walk. 
The remainder of this paper is organised in five sections. Section 2 provides a description of 
the data we use. This is followed in section 3 with a simple statistical analysis, and in section 
4 with the results of more sophisticated regressions. Section 5 discusses some possible 
extensions and provides evidence on the robustness of the results. Section 6 provides a 
conclusion. 
2  Description of the data 
We study the dispersion of monthly survey-based inflation expectations for a number of 
countries from October 1989 to April 2009. The data are collected by Consensus Economics. 
Each month the firm surveys a large cross-section of professional forecasters – currently 
more than 700 world-wide – asking each one for their current and next calendar years’ 
predictions for growth, inflation, unemployment, and short- and long-term interest rates in the 
countries that they follow. For each month, for each variable, Consensus Forecasts reports 
the high, low, and median forecast, as well as the standard deviation of survey responses. 
While Consensus Forecasts supplies forecast information for more than 70 countries, we 
restrict ourselves to the following 15: Australia, Canada, the Euro area, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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and the US. For many of the results, we ignore the Euro area because data are only 
available starting in December 2002. 
Table 1: Dates for which inflation forecast data are available 
  Inflation targeting regime  Non-inflation targeting regime 
Australia  June 1993 to April 2009  November 1990 to May 1993 
Canada  February 1991 to April 2009  October 1989 to January 1991 
Euro Area    December 2002 to April 2009 
France    October 1989 to April 2009 
Germany    October 1989 to April 2009 
Italy    October 1989 to April 2009 
Japan    October 1989 to April 2009 
Netherlands    January 1995 to April 2009 
New Zealand  December 1994 to April 2009   
Norway  March 2001 to April 2009  June 1998 to February 2001 
Spain  January 1995 to June 1998  July 1998 to April 2009 
Sweden  January 1995 to April 2009   
Switzerland  January 2000 to April 2009  June 1998 to December 1999 
United Kingdom  October 1992 to April 2009  October 1989 to September 1992 
United States    October 1989 to April 2009 
Notes: For the ‘Inflation targeting regime’ countries, the dates shown are either the first date of inflation 
targeting or the first date for which data are available; as a result, they do not necessarily correspond to dates 
at which a country adopted an inflation target. For the ‘Non-inflation targeting regime’ countries, the dates 
shown correspond to dates for which the dispersion of inflation and GDP forecasts are available.  
Source: Appendix A, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), Norges Bank Regulation on Monetary Policy, March 
29, 2001. Contrary to the date given in Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, the start date of inflation targeting for 
Australia is June 1993, based on data from the Reserve Bank of Australia. 
 
This sample is sufficiently diverse to allow us to study the impact of inflation targeting, as two 
countries (New Zealand and Sweden) targeted inflation over the entire period, six (Australia, 
Canada, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK) adopted inflation targeting at some point 
during the sample, and the remaining eight have never adopted an explicit inflation target. 
For the second group, the six that adopted an inflation target during the 1990s, we need to 
choose a date for the adoption. It is perhaps surprising that there is disagreement on this 
timing. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), Ball and Sheridan (2005), and Truman (2003), 
among others, all choose slightly different dates. For the most part, we adopt the dating in 
Appendix A of Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007). 
To continue, we need a bit of notation. We use the general form  ( ) .,. it S to denote the standard 
deviation of private sector forecasts for country i made on date t. Next, we specify the 
variable being forecasted as π for CPI inflation and y for GDP growth, and whether the 
forecast is for the current year, which we denote by c, or for the next year, which we denote 
by n. Using this notation,  () c Sit , π  is the standard deviation of private sector forecasts for 
CPI inflation made at date t for the current year (the year containing t). Analogously, 
() n Sit , π is the standard deviation of private sector forecasts for CPI inflation also made at Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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date  t but for the next year (the year containing t+1), and  ( ) c y Sit , and  () n y Sit ,  are the 
standard deviations of private sector forecasts for GDP growth for the current and next year, 
respectively. 



























Source: Consensus Economics. 
 


























Source: Consensus Economics. 
 
To provide a sense of the time-series properties of the data, Figures 1 and 2 plot the 
standard deviation of current and next year’s forecasts of inflation,  () c Sit , π and  () n Sit , π , for 
all the countries in our sample. Simple inspection reveals that the standard deviation of 
forecasts for the current year,  ( ) c Sit , π  plotted in Figure 1, has significant seasonality; while Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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() n Sit , π  has less seasonality. Focusing on  ( ) c Sit , π , a closer look shows that the standard 
deviation is highest in January and falls throughout the year. This is not at all surprising, 
since as a particular year progresses, inflation during that year increasingly becomes an 
historical fact that need not be estimated. 
To assess the seasonality in these series, we assume they are deterministic and estimate 
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where  m
kt D  is a monthly dummy for month k. Notice that for this exercise, the coefficients (the 
k β ’s) are constrained to be equal across all of the countries in the sample. 
The coefficients from equations (1) and (2), with a 95% confidence interval, are plotted in 
Figure 3. We report the coefficients from left to right depending on the amount of time from 
the date of the survey to the end of the period covered by the forecast. Starting on the far 
left, the first observation, labelled ‘Jan_n,’ is the coefficient associated with the dummy 
variable for the standard deviation of the January forecast for the next year’s inflation ( n
1 β ), 
which is completed 24 months in the future. By contrast, the far right of the figure plots the 
coefficient associated with the standard deviation of inflation in December of the current year 
( c
12 β ), which is completed in only one month. While the relationship is not linear, it is clearly 
declining. A regression of { n
1 β , n
2 β  …, c
11 β , c
12 β } against {1, 2, ...,23, 24} yields a slope coefficient 
of -0.012 and a t-statistic of 16.2.
1  This means that the marginal effect of an additional month 
of data reduces the standard deviation of private inflation forecasts by 0.012. The average 
value of  () n Sit , π  in January (the standard deviation of private sector forecasts for ‘next’ year 
in January of ‘this’ year) is 0.377 percentage points and the average value of  ( ) c Sit , π  in 
December is 0.094 percentage points. Thus, each additional month of data tightens the 
spread of private sector inflation forecasts (reduces the standard deviation) by 3.2 percent 
                                                  
1   We also regressed the coefficients against {1, 2, …, 12, 0, …, 0} and {0, …, 0, 1, 2, …, 12}. The slope 
coefficients (t-statistics) were -0.003 (2.80) and -0.024 (23.1). Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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(0.012 / 0.377). The implication of all of this is that it is important that further analysis account 
for the pronounced seasonality in the data. 










Jan_n Mar_n May_n Jul_n Sep_n Nov_n Jan_c Mar_c May_c Jul_c Sep_c Nov_c
Source: Author’s calculations based on equations (1) and (2). 
3  Simple statistical tests 
We now turn to the key question of this paper: is the spread (standard deviation) of inflation 
forecasts by survey participants lower in countries that adopt an explicit inflation target? To 
examine this, we start with some very simple statistics designed to measure whether the 
spreads  () c Sit , π  and  () n Sit , π  are lower when a country’s policymakers employ an inflation 
target. For clarity, we do this with a series of regressions. In the first one we estimate the 
following regression for each country separately: 
  ∑
=
+ + + =
12
2





kt k it u et T D c S γ β α π
      
(3) 
and similarly for  ( ) n Sit , π . Of course, the variable ‘Target’ is only included if the country was 
both an inflation and non-inflation targeter during the sample period. In addition, since the 
available data are different for different countries, each equation is estimated with a different 
number of observations. 
The results are shown in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 and summarised in Table 2. Note, 
there are only 6 countries that switched regimes during the sample period. For these 
countries, the average standard deviation for the non-inflation targeting regime is α, for the 
inflation targeting regime is α + γ, and γ is the difference. If the dispersion is smaller for 
inflation targeting regimes, we would expect to see γ < 0. Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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Table 2:  Comparing the standard deviation of inflation forecasts for 
countries that switch regime 
γ 
Standard deviation of 
current year’s inflation 
forecast,  ( ) c Sit , π  
Standard deviation of next 
year’s inflation forecast, 
() n Sit , π  
Negative, significant at 5%  Australia, UK  Australia, Canada, UK 
Negative, insignificant at 5%  Spain, Switzerland   
Positive, insignificant at 5%  Canada  Switzerland 
Positive, significant at 5%  Norway  Norway, Spain 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on country-by-country estimation of equation (3). 
 
These results allow us to conclude that for those countries that adopted inflation targeting 
during the period 1990 to 2009, the standard deviation of private sector forecasts for CPI 
inflation sometimes falls and sometimes rises. Specifically, the standard deviation of inflation 
forecasts falls when Australia, Canada, and United Kingdom adopt inflation targets; but it 
increases when Norway adopts an inflation target. Spain and Switzerland are somewhere in 
between, depending on whether you are looking at the dispersion of current year forecasts or 
next year forecasts. 
A next step is to estimate the equations jointly using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression 
approach. Since the model is estimated as a set of equations, we need the same number of 
observations for all countries. There are basically three different start dates that could be 
used: November 1990, January 1995, or June 1998. Depending on the start date, the 
number of countries that were both inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters differs, as 
seen in Table 3. There is clearly a trade-off between sample size, number of countries, and 
mix of inflation regimes.  
Table 3: Inflation regime status for various start dates 
Start date  Switched  Non-targeter  Targeter only 
November 1990 




Italy, Japan, US 
 
January 1995 
(T = 172, N = 12) 
















Source: Table 1. 
 
Table 4 summarises the results of estimation using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression 
approach, focusing on the sign and significance of the inflation targeting variable for 
countries that were both inflation targeters and non-targeters. (Additional results are shown 
in Appendix Table A.3.) In general, the results are similar to the single equation regressions 
in Table 2: sometimes the coefficient is negative and sometimes it is positive; sometimes it is Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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significantly different from zero at standard levels of statistical significance and sometimes it 
is not. 
Table 4: Comparing the impact of inflation targeting on the standard 
deviation of inflation forecasts for inflation targeting and non-inflation 
targeting central banks using SUR 
γ 
Standard deviation of 
current year’s inflation 
forecast,  ( ) c Sit , π  
Standard deviation of next 
year’s inflation forecast, 
() n Sit , π  
Negative, significant at 5%  Australia, UK (1990) 
Spain (1995) 
Australia (1990) 
Negative, insignificant at 5%  Spain (1998)  U.K. (1990) 
Spain (1998) 
Positive, insignificant at 5%  Canada (1990) 
Switzerland (1998) 
Canada (1990) 
Positive, significant 5%  Norway (1998)  Spain (1995) 
Norway (1998) 
Switzerland (1998) 
Note: The dates in parentheses denote the start dates for the estimation. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SUR estimation of equation (3). 
 
So far, the determinants of the dispersion of private sector forecasts are deterministic 
variables: seasonal dummies and an inflation targeting dummy. There are no economic 
variables that may affect the dispersion of forecasts. For example, the dispersion of inflation 
forecasts may be greater when overall macroeconomic variability is greater. While we do not 
have a country-specific measure of macroeconomic variability, we use the dispersion of 
private sector forecasts of GDP growth. To avoid any simultaneity concerns, we actually use 
the lagged value of the spread of GDP forecasts,  ) , ( 1 , c y S t i −  and  ) , ( 1 , n y S t i − . In addition, to 
capture the fact that volatility may have changed over time reflecting the so-called ‘Great 
Moderation’ and then the more recent financial crisis, we include a year variable and two 
dummy variables to capture the recent financial crisis. The two financial crisis variables are 
Crisis1 = 1 for September 2007 – September 2008, and Crisis2 = 1 for October 2008 – April 
2009. These two variables reflect the fact that the financial crisis is generally thought to have 
started in August 2007 and then intensified in September 2008. Since the survey 
respondents presumably did not recognise the start and intensification of the crisis until the 
next month, the Crisis variables are dated one month after the start and intensification. In 
addition, we allow the current inflation dispersion to depend on its own lagged value, 















i it Crisis Crisis year Target D c S 2 2 1 1
12
2
) , ( κ κ δ γ β α π + + + + + = ∑
=    (4)
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Since the model is estimated as a set of equations, a Target variable can only be included for 
those countries that switched during the same period. 
The results of estimating these equations using Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regression 
approach are summarised in Table 5. With three different start dates, the countries that were 
both inflation targeting and non-inflation targeting differ. We report results only for the 
countries that change regime, so the coefficient of interest on Target can be estimated. 
 
Table 5: Seemingly unrelated regression estimation 
January 1990 – April 2009 
Current year spread  Next year spread 























































































Note: Numbers in brackets are asymptotic t-ratios. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on equation (4). 
 
This exercise allows us to draw several conclusions. First, the coefficients on Target reported 
in Table 5 are generally insignificant. However, the estimates of γ
c  in the equation for 
() c Sit , π are positive and significant for Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. Second, the 
coefficient on the lagged value of the spread of the inflation forecast (ρ
c and ρ
n) is positive 
and significant, with the estimated impact in the regression of the dispersion in next year’s 
inflation forecast larger than for the current year’s inflation forecast (ρ
n >ρ
c). And third, in 
looking at the full set of regressions not reported in the table, the coefficient on the lagged 
value of S(y,.) is generally insignificant. When the coefficient is significant, it is mostly 
positive, although there are a couple of cases when the coefficient is negative and 
significant. 
While these results are interesting, they fail to utilise information from the countries that 
either never adopted an inflation target or did so prior to the beginning of our sample. We Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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now turn to a more sophisticated analysis designed to account for seasonality, control for 
general macroeconomic volatility, and employ all of the data we have available. 
4 Panel  regressions 
The various shortcomings mentioned at the end of the previous section can be addressed by 
estimating a set of equations using a panel regression approach. By estimating various 
regressions using both fixed effects and random effects (Baum (2006)), we show that there is 
little evidence that inflation targeting countries have a smaller dispersion of private sector 
inflation forecasts. 
Fixed Effects (FE) 
We start by estimating some fixed effects models given the general applicability of this 
approach. To capture the fact that volatility may have changed over time reflecting the Great 
Moderation and then the more recent financial crisis, several dummy variables are included 
in the equation. Specifically, year dummy variables are included (Year1991, …, Year2006), 
where, for example, Year1991 = 1 for 1991. We also define Year2007 = 1 for January 2007 – 
August 2007, Crisis1 = 1 for September 2007 – September 2008, and Crisis2 = 1 for October 
2008 – April 2009. The results from estimating the following equation (or some variant of it) 
are reported in Table 6 and the time-varying constants (the constant and terms related to 
time) are shown in Figure 4.
2 
















) , ( κ κ δ β α π + + + + + = ∑ ∑
= =









i n y S n S et T ε θ π ρ γ + + + + − − ) , ( ) , ( arg 1 1  
where the constant α can be thought of as a mixture of the average level in January, the 
base month, plus the average impact of October 1989 to December 1990, while the u is the 
country-specific fixed effect. In addition, the table reports the long-run effect of inflation 
targeting on the dispersion: γ/(1-ρ). 
In all cases, the coefficient on Target is negative, which suggests that countries with an 
inflation target have a smaller standard deviation of private sector inflation forecasts. 
However, the coefficient is significant only for the bare-bones regression (excluding lagged 
                                                  
2   The chart plots the constant term (α) and coefficient on variables related to January of each year: Yeart (δt), 
Crisis1it (κ1), and Crisis2it (κ2).  In this way, the chart plots the “time varying constant term.” Specifically, the 
value plotted for the years 1991 – 2007 are = α + δt for 2008 = α + κ1, and for 2009 = α + κ2. Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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values of  () . , π S  and  () . , y S . In addition, the coefficients on lagged values of  () . , π S and  ( ) . , y S  
are positive and significant. The estimate of ρ is 0.49 for regressions using  () c Sit , π and 0.74 
when looking at ( ) n Sit , π . This suggests that the persistence of the spread is less for current 
year forecasts than for next year forecasts, but still sizeable. A larger coefficient on the 
lagged spread for next year forecasts than for current year forecasts might suggest that 
incoming monthly data plays a smaller role for next year forecasts than for current year 
forecasts. In addition, to the extent that lagged values of  () . , y S capture overall 
macroeconomic uncertainty, the positive and significant coefficients suggest that the 
standard deviation of inflation forecasts depend on macroeconomic uncertainty. 
Table 6: Panel estimation using fixed effects 
 
Standard deviation of current 
year’s inflation forecasts, 
( ) c Sit , π  
Standard deviation of next 
year’s inflation forecasts,  
() n Sit , π  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Lagged  () ⋅ π, it S (ρ)    0.488
[29.1]   0.737
[57.3]



























σε  0.084 0.083 0.073 0.119 0.118 0.180
N 2895  2880 2880 2895 2880  2880
Note: Asymptotic t-ratios are in brackets. Coefficients on monthly and yearly dummy variables are not shown. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on equation (5). 
 









91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
S(π,c)
S(π,n)
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 4 shows the effect of time and the financial crisis on the standard deviation of private 
sector forecasts of current and next year inflation made in January. In general, the standard 
deviation declined from 1991 to 1999, was stable through 2006, and then rose significantly in 
2008 and 2009. This suggests that the ‘Great Moderation’ did lead to a reduction in the 
dispersion of private sector forecasts of inflation through the first part of the sample period 
and that the financial crisis led to an increase in the dispersion. Interestingly, the coefficient 
on (α + δ) in 2009 is about the same as in the early 1990s for  ( ) n S , π  but higher for  ( ) c S , π . 
While the coefficient on Target is negative for both  ( ) c S , π  and  ( ) n S , π , the magnitude is 
economically small. There are several ways to see this. First, look back at Figures 1 and 2 
and note that the average of  () c S , π  is roughly 0.20 while  ( ) n S , π  averages closer to 0.35. 
This means that the estimated impact of inflation targeting even in the long run (0.017 and 
0.036) is to reduce the standard deviation of inflation forecasts by 10 percent or less. 
A second way to see that γ is economically small is to compare it to the impact of the 
financial crisis. To do this, we consider what would happen to  ( ) c S , π  if a country were to 
adopt an inflation target in February 2007 versus adopting it in February 2009. Taking the 
case of the United States, we use equation (2) to calculate the predicted value of  ( ) c S , π  first 
with the Target = 0 (no inflation target) and then with the Target = 1 (assuming the US had 
an inflation target). The result is that the predicted dispersion in survey inflation expectations 
would fall from 0.269 to 0.260 in February 2007, but from 0.663 to 0.654 in February 2009. In 
other words, while dispersion would be less, the impact of financial turmoil on the dispersion 
is much larger –0.394 versus –0.036, or 11 times larger. 
Random Effects (RE) 
We next considered estimating the panel regression using a random effects estimator. The 
fixed effects (FE) model specifies the country specific effect as a constant, whereas the 
random effects (RE) model specifies the country specific effect as a random variable that is 
uncorrelated with the regressors. Breusch and Pagan (1980) developed a Lagrange 
multiplier test for  0 2 = σu ; the p-value is reported in Table 9 in the row labeled ‘ 0 2 = σu  p-value.’ 
If the orthogonality assumption is true, then the random effects model is more efficient 
because it uses the assumption that ui is uncorrelated with the regressors. Of course, if this 
assumption is false, then the random effects model is inconsistent. We can then use a 
Hausman test of the extra orthogonality condition imposed by the random effects estimator. 
The idea of the Hausman test is simple: if the regressors are uncorrelated with ui, the fixed 
effects estimator is consistent but inefficient and the random effects estimator is consistent 
and efficient; however, if the regressors are correlated with ui, the fixed effects estimator is Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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consistent but the random effects estimator is inconsistent. Table 7 estimates the same 
models and includes the p-value from the Hausman test in the row labelled ‘Hausman’.
3 
Table 7: Panel estimation using random effects 
 
Standard deviation of current 
year’s inflation forecasts, 
) , ( c Sit π  
Standard deviation of next 
year’s inflation forecasts, 
) , ( n Sit π  































2 0.39  0.49 0.65 0.25 0.31  0.76
σε 0.084  0.083 0.073 0.119 0.118  0.080
0 2 = σu  p-value  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hausman p-value  0.276  0.000 0.000 0.961 0.999  0.000
N 2895  2880 2880 2895 2880  2880
Note: Asymptotic t-ratios are in brackets. Coefficients on monthly dummy variables are not shown. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on equation (5). 
 
The results from using random effects to estimate the model are mixed. The coefficient on 
Target is sometimes negative and insignificant and other times it is positive and significant. 
Not surprisingly, one can always reject the hypothesis that  0 2 = σu . Unfortunately, one can 
often reject the hypothesis that the orthogonality condition holds. In general, it appears as 
though we cannot reject the hypothesis that the orthogonality condition holds for the stripped-
down model (which includes only Target and year and month dummies) but we can generally 
reject the orthogonality condition when we include lagged values of  .) , (π S  and  .) , (y S . 
Interestingly, in the bare-bones model (which fails to reject the Hausman test) the coefficient 
on Target is negative but insignificant. 
                                                  
3   Including a lagged dependent variable in a fixed effects model creates a large-sample bias in the estimate of 
the coefficient on lagged dependent variable. Since we are not really interested in this estimate, the concern is 
somewhat mitigated. In addition, in a simple model Nickell (1981) shows that for large values of T, the limit of 
) ˆ ( ρ − ρ as  ∞ → N  is approximately –(1+ρ)/(T-1). With ρ = 0.5 (0.8) and T = 235, the bias will be -0.0064 (-
0.0077). Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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5  Robustness and Extensions 
In this section, we check the robustness of the results by considering six modifications to the 
baseline model: 
•  we examine the sensitivity of the results to individual countries 
•  we compute the standard errors of the estimated coefficients using alternative 
techniques 
•  we consider the effect of the dating of the introduction of inflation targeting 
•  we include various measures of actual inflation 
•  we introduce commodity prices into the model 
•  we replace the standard deviation of forecasts with their root mean square error. 
In what follows, we discuss results only for the fixed effects panel regression using 
() c Sit , π and () . ,n Sit π  Thus, each of the six modifications to the baseline model is compared to 
the results in Table 6. In general, the conclusions from the previous section are supported. 
Sensitivity to individual countries 
Since the panel includes 15 countries, the first robustness check is to see whether some 
countries are ‘influential’. To check this, the fixed-effects panel regression is estimated with 
all countries, and then we exclude one country at a time. So, for example, we re-estimate the 
model with Australia excluded, we then include Australia but exclude Canada, we then 
include Australia and Canada, but exclude Norway, and continue in this way. 
Table 8 reports the coefficients and t-statistics on Target (γ) for all three panel equations for 
all countries, corresponding to the columns as labelled in Table 6, and then for each 
excluded country. In looking at the table, the appropriate comparison is between the first row 
(‘None’ excluded) and each subsequent row. 
The results suggest that Canada and Norway may be influential for S(π, c) and that Canada, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain, may be influential for S(π, n). First, note that in all 
but 6 cases – 2 for  ) , ( c S π and 4 for S(π, n) – the sign remains negative. In the 6 cases 
when the sign changes (Australia and the United Kingdom), the coefficient is small and 
insignificant. More importantly, Canada and Norway appear to be influential for  ) , ( c S π  
because the coefficient is insignificant in columns 2 and 3 when all countries are included, 
but becomes significant when Canada and Norway are excluded. This suggests that Canada 
and Norway are the countries behind the insignificant coefficient when all countries are 
included. These result may not be too surprising since the coefficient on Target was positive Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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and insignificant for Canada and positive and significant for Norway in Tables 2, 4, and 5. In 
addition, when looking at the results for  ) , ( n S π , Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Spain are influential in the same way: the coefficient on Target becomes significant when 
these countries are excluded in columns 5 or 6. As with ) , ( c S π , the earlier results in Tables 
2, 4, and 5,  these results are not surprising given. 
Table 8: Are Countries Influential? 
Fixed-effects panel estimation of impact of inflation targeting (γ
c and γ
n) 
Standard deviation of current 
year’s inflation forecasts, 
( ) c Sit , π  
Standard deviation of next 
year’s inflation forecasts,  
() n Sit , π  
Excluded 
Country 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
































































































































































































Note: Asymptotic t-ratios are in brackets. The coefficient and t-statistic on inflation target ( γ ) are reported. 
Numbers in parentheses at the top of the columns refer to those in Table 6. 
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Table 9: Alternative Standard Errors 
Panel Estimation using fixed effects 
 
Standard deviation of current 
year’s inflation forecasts, 
() c Sit , π  
Standard deviation of next 
year’s inflation forecasts,  
( ) n Sit , π  


































































2 0.36  0.44 0.62 0.24 0.29  0.75
σε  0.084 0.083 0.073 0.119 0.118 0.080
N 2895  2880 2880 2895 2880  2880
Note: Three sets of t-statistics, all in brackets, are provided for each coefficient estimate. The first is the 
asymptotic t-statistic computed using the conventionally computed standard error. The second is based on a 
standard error that is robust to heteroskedasticity. And the third is computed using a bootstrap. Coefficients on 
monthly and yearly dummy variables are not shown. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on equation (5). 
Alternative measure of standard errors 
Given the range of countries included in the panel of countries, the conventional standard 
errors reported in Table 6 may be misleading. Therefore, another robustness check involves 
estimating alternative standard errors. The standard errors reported in Table 6 are the typical 
standard errors for generalised least squares. As a check, Table 9 reports 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and bootstrap standard errors. 
Not surprisingly, the t-statistics are smaller. In particular, the t-statistic on the Inflation Target 
is now insignificant in all cases when using the robust or bootstrap standard errors. However, 
the other coefficients generally remain significant (the coefficient on lagged  ( ) n y Sit ,  is 
insignificant no matter what standard errors are used). 
Dating the introduction of inflation targeting 
As noted earlier, the dating of the inflation-targeting regime is somewhat ad hoc and different 
researchers use different dates for the start of the regime. In addition, if survey participants 
take time to learn about the inflation targeting regime (for example, how serious are the 
authorities?), then an alternative dating regime could give different results. To test this Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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hypothesis, the fixed effects panel regressions are re-estimated using the third lag of Target 
rather than the current value of Target (from Table 1), thus allowing survey participants three 
months to learn about the new regime.  The results are shown in Table 10. 
In this case, the coefficients on the lagged inflation target variable are somewhat larger (in 
absolute value) and significant for all three models for ( ) c Sit , π , compared to only one of the 
models in Table 6. And the coefficient is significant for two out of three models for  ( ) n Sit , π , 
compared to only one of the models in Table 6. Thus, there is some evidence that it takes a 
couple of months for survey participants to respond to the introduction of an inflation 
targeting regime. Stated somewhat differently, it means the first three months of inflation 
targeting are influential observations in models 2, 3, and 5 because the coefficient on the 
inflation targeting variable is insignificant when these observations are included but the 
coefficient is significant when these observations are excluded. 
Table 10: Effect of Lagging the Date of Introduction of Inflation Targeting 
Panel Estimation using fixed effects 
 
Standard deviation of current 
year’s inflation forecasts, 
( ) c Sit , π  
Standard deviation of next 
year’s inflation forecasts,  















Lagged  () ⋅ π, it S  (ρ)    0.485
[29.6]   0.737
[57.2]








) 1 ( ρ −
γ  
  -0.027
[2.1]   -0.025
[0.9]
R
2   0.49  0.50 0.62 0.33 0.34  0.69
σε    
N 2850  2850 2850 2850 2850  2850
Note: Asymptotic t-ratios are in brackets. Coefficients on monthly and yearly dummy variables are not shown.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on equation (5) with Target lagged 3 months. 
 
Including measures of actual inflation 
Turning now to some extensions of the baseline model, we first introduce various measures 
of actual inflation into the specification. One measure of inflation is the percent change in the 
CPI from 12 months ago and the other measure is the year-average-over-year-average 
percent change. Since the survey participants provide estimates of the year-average-over-
year-average inflation rate, the percent change from 12 months ago is not exactly 
comparable to the inflation rate being forecasted. However, it does provide actual inflation 
data that survey participants could use in forecasting inflation. The year-average-over-year-Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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average inflation rate is comparable, but is the same for all months in the year. Including the 
lagged value of either inflation rate does not change the results in any meaningful way: the t-
statistic on the inflation rate is always less than 1.0. (To conserve space, the results are not 
shown.) 
Another inflation measure turned out to be significant. Since the dependent variable is the 
dispersion of private sector forecasts, one might expect that the variability of inflation would 
be a significant explanatory variable. The results in Table 6 suggest that the dispersion of 
private sector forecasts is a significant explanatory variable. We extend those results by 
including a measure of the variability of actual inflation, measured as the 12-month rolling 
standard deviation of month-over-year-ago inflation rates. This variable is significant in all six 
cases; the t-statistic is between 6.5 and 12.3 in equations for ( ) c S , π and between 4.1 and 10.1 
in equations for () n S , π . However, the coefficients and t-statistics on the other variables are 
fairly similar, so the results are not shown (to conserve space). 
Table 11: Including Volatility of Commodity Price Inflation 
Panel Estimation using fixed effects 
 
Standard deviation of current 
year’s inflation forecasts, 
( ) c Sit , π  
Standard deviation of next 
year’s inflation forecasts,  
() n Sit , π  












Lagged  () ⋅ π, it S (ρ) 
  0.495
[29.7]   0.725
[54.2]
 








) 1 ( ρ
γ
−
    -0.007
[0.5]   -0.016
[0.5]
R
2 0.363  0.442 0.660 0.135 0.163  0.726
σε  0.078 0.077 0.067 0.114 0.114 0.079
N 2811  2803 2803 2811 2803  2803
Note: Asymptotic t-ratios are in brackets. Coefficients on monthly and yearly dummies are not shown. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on equation (5) with commodity prices added. 
 
Commodity prices 
Given the wide range of countries used in the panel, the effect of having an inflation target 
may be overwhelmed by other factors. In particular, some countries are more susceptible to 
commodity price shocks than other countries. In an effort to check this, we extend the results 
in Table 6 by including a measure of the volatility of commodity price inflation. Specifically, 
we include the lagged value of the rolling 12-month standard deviation of the percent change 
(from the previous month) in a commodity price index; the index used is the Commodity 
Research Bureau spot raw industrial price index. The same commodity price index is used Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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for all countries under the assumption that commodity prices are set in world markets. 
However, the coefficient on the commodity price variable is allowed to be different for each 
country. The results are shown in Table 11. Recall that there are 15 countries and three 
equations for  () c Sit , π , so there are 45 coefficients for commodity price variability. In order to 
conserve space the coefficients on commodity price variability are not shown. Briefly, the 
coefficients on commodity price variability are almost always positive and significant. For the 
() c Sit , π  equations, 36 of the 45 coefficients are positive and significant, and the other nine 
coefficients are positive and insignificant. For the  ( ) n Sit , π  equations, 35 of the coefficients 
are positive (24 are significant and 11 are insignificant) and 10 of the coefficients are 
negative (two are significant and eight are insignificant). Returning to our primary interest, 
however, we note that when we add the commodity price variation measure to the 
regression, the coefficient on Inflation Target is similar in magnitude and significance in the 
() c Sit , π equations, but about half the magnitude and significance in the  () n Sit , π  equations. 
Root-mean-square error 
Finally, we estimated a model similar to equation (3) but using the root-mean-squared-error 
of the inflation forecast,  () c RMSEit , π  and  ( ) n RMSEit , π  rather than using the standard deviation 
of current (and next) year’s inflation forecast. (Appendix 1 describes the mechanics of how 
the  RMSE  is recovered from the data we have available.) Specifically, we estimate the 






















) , ( κ κ δ β α π + + + + + = ∑ ∑
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i n y S n RMSE et T ε θ π ρ γ + + + + − − ) , ( ) , ( arg 1 1 1 1   
(6) 
Table 12 reports the results of this exercise. These are clearly more compelling than what we 
obtained using the dispersion of private sector forecasts against an inflation targeting 
variable. In particular, the coefficient on Inflation Target is negative and significant in 5 of the 
6 equations. 
While it may appear that the RMSE results are stronger than those using the dispersion, we 
view them with caution for two reasons. First, while the coefficient on the inflation target 
variable is larger when using RMSE than when using  ( ) ,. π it S , the RMSE itself is also larger 
than  () ,. π it S . For example, the average (across all countries and time) of  () c Sit , π  is 0.20 
while the average of  () c RMSEit , π  is 0.40; and the average of  () n Sit , π  is 0.34 while the 
average of  ( ) c RMSEit , π  is 0.77. A better way to compare the results using  ( ) ,. π it S  and Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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RMSE is to look at the effect of adopting an inflation target relative to the average value of 
() ,. π it S  and  () ,. π it RMSE as we did above. Here the results are the same, the reduction in 
() ,. π it S or  ( ) ,. π it RMSE is small relative to the average size of S(π, .) or  () ,. π it RMSE for non-
inflation targeting regimes. The reduction is between 3 percent and 47 percent, depending on 
which model is used and whether we look at current year or next year forecasts. Second, the 
() ,. π it RMSE is much more volatile than  ( ) ,. π it S . And not only is it more volatile, the volatility 
is more episodic in that there are some years when  ( ) ,. π it RMSE is three to five times larger 
than  () ,. π it S and other years when they are about the same magnitude. Part of the reason is 
that  () ,. π it RMSE  is calculated from relative actual inflation measured as year-average-over-
year-average percent change and is thus the same for all months in a given year. 
Table 12: Using the Root-Mean-Square Error 
Panel Estimation using fixed effects 
 
Standard deviation of current 
year’s inflation forecasts, 
( ) c RMSEit , π  
Standard deviation of next 
year’s inflation forecasts,  
() n RMSEit , π  













() ⋅ π, it RMSE (ρ)    0.790
[68.1]   0.859
[87.6]
 








) 1 ( ρ −
γ     -0.091
[1.3]   --0.303
[2.7]
R
2 0.10  0.16 0.79 0.07 0.10  0.84
σε  0.257 0.254 0.156 0.396 0.395 0.203
N 2835  2820 2820 2820 2805  2805
Note: Asymptotic t-ratios are in brackets. Coefficients on monthly and yearly dummy variables are not shown.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on equation (7) with the RMSE as the left-hand-side variable. 
6 Conclusions 
Using survey data on inflation expectations drawn from Consensus Forecast, we find little 
evidence that inflation targeting countries have a smaller dispersion of private sector 
forecasts of inflation. While for some countries, some models, and some estimation 
techniques, we estimate that inflation targeting countries have a smaller dispersion of private 
sector inflation forecasts, for other countries, other models, and other estimation techniques, 
we find that they do not. 
Returning to the question that motivated this analysis – ‘Does increased transparency lead to 
lower dispersion in private forecasts?’ – the answer appears to be no. This suggests to us Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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that the Morris and Shin argument that increased transparency could be destabilising is of 
little practical concern to policymakers. And even in the cases when inflation targeting leads 
to a lower dispersion of private forecasts, we cannot necessarily conclude that greater 
transparency is harmful because the lower dispersion could reflect the beneficial effects from 
greater transparency rather than the harmful effects from greater coordination. Of course, 
since the survey we use only reports results of forecasts for inflation in the current year and 
the next year, our results are unable to shed light on whether the distribution of private sector 
forecasts of long-run inflation is lower. However, even if the inflation target is for the medium-
run, one would expect that the dispersion of inflation forecasts for ‘next year’ may still be 
somewhat smaller than otherwise. Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Average standard deviation of current year inflation forecasts 
α—January  
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Table A.2: Average standard deviation of next year inflation forecasts 
α—January  
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Table A.3: Coefficient on inflation targeting dummy variable 
    November 1990 – 
April 2009 
January 1995 – April 
2009 
June 1998 – 
April 2009 
Australia  ( ) c Sit , π   -0.109
[5.9]
 
  ( ) n Sit , π   -0.182
[6.0]
 
Canada  ( ) c Sit , π   0.049
[1.7]
 
  ( ) n Sit , π   0.004
[0.1]
 
UK  ( ) c Sit , π   -0.077
[4.3]
 
  ( ) n Sit , π   -0.059
[1.9]
 








Norway  ( ) c Sit , π    0.135
[8.3]
  ( ) n Sit , π    0.117
[6.8]
Switzerland  ( ) c Sit , π    0.008
[1.1]
  ( ) n Sit , π    0.040
[2.4]Cecchetti and Hakkio    Inflation targeting and private sector forecasts    October 2009 
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, π  = inflation forecast (f) for country i, for the current year, made by forecaster j at time 
t and 
ai
t π   = actual inflation for country i at time t.  Since the inflation forecasts are for 
year/year (rather than month/month-year-ago),  
ai
t π  is the same for each month in the year 






Jan 1990 1990 1990 π π π = = = K .  Next, let E
j denote taking 







, ) ( π π =  (which no longer 
has the j subscript) is reported in Consensus Forecasts—namely the average forecast for 
inflation in country i for the current year, made at time t.  There is obviously a similar variable 
for next year, replacing “c” with “n”.  Finally, 
c fi
t it S c S
, ) , ( π π =  is reported in Consensus 
Forecasts—the standard deviation of the private sector forecasts for the current year for 






, π ,and 
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We calculate the variance of private sector forecasts =
c fi
t V
,   (across forecasters) = 
2 , ] [
c fi
t Sπ  
as follows: 
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We can use this equation to solve for 
2 , ] [
c fi
jt
j E π  (since we have all terms on the RHS of the 
equation): 
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Notice, we have all terms on the RHS of this equation.  We can also calculate the RMSE of 
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where we use actual inflation at “t+1” rather than at “t”. 
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